TaoSecurity Blog

A friend from my AFCERT days left a comment indicating that the 33 IOS split into two different squadrons, the 33 NWS (the old AFCERT) and the 91 NWS. This prompted me to look at the organizational structure of my old Air Force units. I realized that last month what used to be Air Intelligence Agency is now Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency , according to this story . AFISR now works as a field operating agency for AF/A2 , the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula . AIA was part of 8th Air Force , but that experiment has been reversed. It looks like AFISR has lost information operations duties since it's now an "ISR" agency. According to Air Force ISR Agency , the AF/A2 says: "Air Intelligence Agency was traditionally focused on a particular intelligence discipline, signals intelligence," said General Koziol. "Now we are expanding our capabilities into geo-spatia

Marcin Wielgoszewski interview me for his TSSCI Blog . He asked me about my start in security, how to be a good analyst, and concerns for the future. Thanks to Marcin for asking solid questions.

Last month in Security Application Instrumentation I wrote: Right now you're [developers] being taught (hopefully) "secure coding." I would like to see the next innovation be security application instrumentation, where you devise your application to report not only performance and fault logging, but also security and compliance logging. This is a forward-looking plea. In the meantime, we are stuck with numerous platforms, operating systems, applications, and data (POAD) for which we have zero visibility. I suggest that enterprises consider hiring or assigning a new role -- Enterprise Visibility Architect . The role of the EVA is to identify visibility deficiencies in existing and future POAD and design solutions to instrument these resources. What does this mean in real life? Here is an example. Let's say a company operates a FTP proxy for business use. Consider various stakeholders involved with that server and the sorts of visibility they might want: Data cen

This is a note for myself, so if you're looking for uber-security insights today, please skip this post. If you do stick with me and you can suggest ways to do this better, please share your comments. Earlier this year I posted TaoSecurity CVS at Sourceforge and Committing Changes to CVS . Since posting my Sguil on FreeBSD scripts at TaoSecurity Sourceforge I needed to make a few changes. The system hosting my original files suffered a lightning strike, so I decided to retrieve the files from CVS and make changes. Checking out the scripts can be done anonymously without a password. (Note there are some artificial line breaks in these and other lines.) $ cvs -d:pserver:anonymous@taosecurity.cvs.sourceforge.net:/cvsroot/taosecurity login Logging in to :pserver:anonymous@taosecurity.cvs.sourceforge.net:2401 /cvsroot/taosecurity CVS password: $ cvs -d:pserver:anonymous@taosecurity.cvs.sourceforge.net:/cvsroot/taosecurity co -P taosecurity_sguil_scripts cvs checkout: Updating

Very shortly Amazon.com should post my four star review of Cross Site Scripting Attacks: XSS Exploits and Defense . Observe that no one (Amazon.com, Syngress) displays the actual cover for this book on their Web sites. From the review: XSS Attacks earns 4 stars for being the first book devoted to Cross Site Scripting and for rounding up multiple experts on the topic. The authors are synonymous with attacking Web applications and regularly share their vast expertise via their blogs and tools. However, XSS Attacks suffers the same problems found whenever Syngress rushes a book to print -- nonexistent editing and uneven content. I found XSS Attacks to be highly enlightening, but I expect a few other books on the topic arriving later this year could be better. Thanks to Syngress I have review copies of Snort Intrusion Detection and Prevention Toolkit and Stealing the Network: How to Own a Shadow , which I plan to read soon. More late nights in my future...

My previous posts No ROI? No Problem and Security ROI Revisited have been smash hits. The emphasis here is on "smash." At the risk for being branded a glutton for ROI punishment, I present one final scenario to convey my thoughts on this topic. I believe there may be some room for common ground. I am only concerned with the Truth as well as we humans can perceive it. With that, once more unto the breach. It's 1992. Happy Corp. is a collaborative advertisement writing company. A team of writers develop advertisement scripts for TV. Writers exchange ideas and such via hard copy before finalizing their product. Using these methods the company creates an average of 100 advertisement scripts per month, selling them for $1,000 each or a total of $100,000 per month. Happy's IT group proposes Project A. Project A will cost $10,000 to deploy and $1,000 per month to sustain. Project A will provide Happy with email accounts for all writers. As a result of implement

I'd like to briefly point you to two must-read articles, if you haven't seen them already. First, the Honeynet Project published Fast-Flux Service Networks . Basically, intruders have introduced availability and load balancing features into their bot networks by quickly changing the IP addresses of redirectors pointing to back end servers (a technique called "single flux"). They may also rapidly change the IP addresses of the authoritative domain name servers (called "double flux") to further complicate identifying and shutting down bot nets. I'd like to hear how many of you predicted this would happen before the technique was reported by the Honeynet Project this month. Of those that say "I knew," did you know about it a year ago, when it was first detected by the Honeynet Project? And if you have known about it or predicted it, what did you or your security team do to detect and/or mitigate the attack? My point is the vast majority of

This is a quick note for those of you in the northern Virginia area. I am working on meetings for NoVA Sec and NoVA BUG (BSD Users Group). Please check out the most recent posts at each site for details and consider joining one or both groups. I'd like to grow our informal memberships so we have more potential speakers, especially on the BSD side. I keep posts about Sec and BUG to a minimum here because it's a geographically-based topic. Thank you.

July's been a great month for controversy on this blog, so I thought I would continue that them by posting word of my Amazon.com review of Endpoint Security . Yes, I've been reading a lot, and it's been keeping me up past midnight for a few weeks. I've been intensely interested in these recent books, so staying up late has been worthwhile. Unfortunately, as you'll read in my three star review , you can skip Endpoint Security : I really looked forward to reading Endpoint Security. I am involved in a NAC deployment, and I hoped this book could help. While the text does contain several statements that make sense (despite being blunt and confrontational), the underlying premise will not work. Furthermore, simply identifying and understanding the book's central argument is an exercise in frustration. Although Endpoint Security tends not to suffer any technical flaws, from conceptual and implementation points of view this book is disappointing. I just finished this

PaulM left an interesting comment on my post NORAD-Inspired Security Metrics : ...what if the enemy has a stealth plane that we cannot detect via radar, satellite, wind-speed variance, or any other deployed means? And what if your intel doesn't tell us that such a vehicle exists? Then we have potentially millions of airspace breaches every year and our outcome metrics are not helping. I'm not disagreeing with you that outcome metrics are ideally better data than compliance metrics. However, outcome metrics are difficult to identify and collect data on, and it can be difficult to discern how accurate your metrics actually are. At least with compliance metrics, we can determine how good we are at doing what it is we say that we do. It has little relevance to operational security, but it's easy and the auditors seem to like it. For the case of a single breach, or even several breaches, it may be possible for them to happen and be completely undetectable. However, I categoric

When I was a second degree cadet at USAFA (so long ago that, of my entire class, only myself and three friends had 486 PCs with Ethernet NICs) I visited NORAD . I remember thinking the War Games set was cooler, but I didn't give much thought to the security aspects of their mission. Today I remembered NORAD and considered their mission with respect to my post last year titled Control-Compliant vs Field-Assessed Security . In case you can't tell from the pithy title, the central idea was that it's more effective to measure security by assessing outcomes instead of inputs. For example, who cares if 100% of your systems have Windows XP SP2 if they are all 0wned by a custom exploit written just for your company? Your security has failed. Inputs are important, but my experience with various organizations is that they tend to be the primary means of "measuring" security, regardless of how well they actually preserve the CIA triad. Let's put this in terms of NO

Amazon.com just posted my five star review of Network Warrior : Network Warrior is the best network administration book I've ever read. I spend most of my reading time on security books, but because I lean towards network security I like reading complementary sources on protocols and infrastructure. Gary Donahue has written a wonderful book that I highly recommend for anyone who administers, supports, or interacts with networks. Network Warrior may be the best book I will read in 2007. Yeah, I liked it that much. I devoured this book, staying up until 1 am or more several nights in a row. I'm looking forward to reading Mark Kadrich 's Endpoint Security . I think this book will directly affect how I approach some projects at work. I really hope it can help me better understand how to deal with endpoint security in 2007. It's taken me a while to get this book. For some reason it was published in "March 2007" but only available recently. I'd like to

One of you responded to my No ROI? No Problem post with this question: Just read your ROI blog, which I found very interesting. ROI is something I've always tried to put my finger on, and you present an interesting approach. Question: Is it not possible to 'make' money with security, or does it still come down to savings? Example: - A hospital implements a security system that allows doctors to access patient data from anywhere. Now, instead of doing 10 patients a day they can do (and charge) 13 patients a day. I'm not trying to sharp shoot you in anyway, I'm just trying to better understand the economics. This is an excellent question. This is exactly the same concept as I stated in my August 2006 post Real Technology ROI . In this case, doctors are more productive at accessing patient data by virtue of a remote access technology. This is like installing radios for faster dispatch in taxis. In both cases security is not causing a productivity gain but

I continue to be surprised by the confusion surrounding the term Return on Investment (ROI). The Wikipedia entry for Rate of Return treats ROI as a synonym, so it's a good place to go if you want to understand ROI as anyone who's taken introductory corporate finance understands it. In its simplest form, ROI is a mechanism used to choose projects. For example, assume you have $1000 in assets to allocate to one of three projects, all of which have the same time period and risk. Invest $1000. Project yields $900 (-10% ROI) Invest $1000. Project yields $1000 (0% ROI) Invest $1000. Project yields $1100 (10% ROI) Clearly, the business should pursue project 3. Businesspeople make decisions using this sort of mindset. I am no stranger to this world. Consider this example from my consulting past, where I have to choose which engagement to accept for the next week. Spend $1000 on travel, meals, and other expenses. Project pays $900 (-10% ROI) Spend $1000 on travel, meals, and

This evening I watched part of a show called American Greed that discussed the Wheaton Bandit , an armed bank robber who last struck in December 2006 and was never apprehended. Several aspects of the story struck me. First, this criminal struck 16 times in less than five years, only once being repelled when he was detected en route to a bank and locked out by vigilant tellers. Does a criminal who continues to strike without being identified and apprehended bear resemblance to cyber criminals? Second, the banks did not respond by posting guards on site. Guards tend to aggravate the problem and people get hurt, according to the experts cited on the show. Instead, the banks posted greeters right at the front door to say hello to everyone entering the bank. I've noticed this at my own local branch within the last year, but thought it was an attempt to duplicate Wal-Mart; apparently not. Because the robber also disguises himself with a balaclava (pictured at right), the bank

David Bianco clued me in to the fact that, after 15 years, Sys Admin magazine is shutting down. (I was on the road this week and found the issue in my mail when I returned.) The August 2007 issue, pictured at left, is the last. Appropriately for the digital security community, the issue topic is Information Security. I bought my first issue of Sys Admin in the fall of 1999, at the point where I was finally coming to grips with my work at the AFCERT. I had spent the previous year-plus climbing the steep learning curve associated with becoming a network security analyst and I was ready to learn more about system administration. Looking at the copy in my hands, I see where I underlined (using a straight edge, a practice I continue to this day) content I believed was useful. That issue featured articles like: Maintaining Patch Levels with Open Source BSDs by Michael Lucas Landmining the Cracker's Playing Field by Amy Rich Hardening a Host by Dave D. Zwieback Intrusion Detect

Ivan Voras posted word on his FreeBSD development blog that he built a FreeBSD 7 LiveCD . This is part of his 2007 Google Summer of Code project, finstall , a graphical FreeBSD installer that's also a live CD. I think this is great. Booting the installer as a live CD lets a user see if FreeBSD recognizes hardware before committing to an installation. The user also gets to play with FreeBSD without making any changes to the production system. I downloaded the .iso and booted it in VMware to take the screen capture at left. Right now the system doesn't do much, and the keyboard mapping isn't English. (For example, obtaining the - key required me to hit the / key.) I am excited to see this and it would be great to have it ready for FreeBSD 7. I do not think it will happen, but we'll see. Incidentally, this other SOC project looks neat: Super Tunnel Daemon : IP can easily be tunneled over a plethora of network protocols at various layers, such as IP, ICMP, UDP, T

I just made several additions to David Bianco's excellent Network Security Monitoring Wiki . You'll see a new Disk Usage category on the lower right side under the Collecting Data header. I added this category because I'd like to see people contribute metrics on the amount of disk space used by various tools in production environments. I created three more pages: Snort Alerts SANCP Session Data Full Content Data On each page I provided a sample methodology to collect disk usage information for each data type, and provided two examples of production sensors on small links collecting 14 days of data. Please consider following the examples by adding your own numbers to each page. This will help guide partitioning and storage requirements for those trying to build and maintain NSM sensors. Thank you.

My seventh Snort Report on Working with Unified Output has been posted. From the article: In the last Snort Report we looked at output methods for Snort. These included several ways to write data directly to disk, along with techniques for sending alerts via Syslog and even performing direct database inserts. I recommended not configuring Snort to log directly to a database because Snort is prone to drop packets while performing database inserts. In this edition of the Snort Report I demonstrate how to use unified output, the preferred method for high performance Snort operation. In the next edition I plan to discuss testing Snort.

Dan Geer, second of the three wise men , was kind enough to share slides from his Measuring Security USENIX class. If I were not teaching at USENIX I would be in Dan's class. One of the slides bothered me -- not for what Dan said, but for what was said to him. The slide is reproduced above, and the notes below: These are precisely the questions that any CFO would want to know and we are not in a good position to answer. The present author was confronted with this list, exactly as it is, by the CISO of a major Wall Street bank with the preface “Are you security people so stupid that you cannot tell me....” This particular CISO came from management audit and therefore was also saying that were he in any other part of the bank, bond portfolios, dervative pricing, equity trading strategies, etc., he would be able to answer such questions to five digit accuracy. The questions are sound. I think Dan is giving the CISO too much credit. I think the questions are "semi-sound,"

I received the following email from a friend. He agreed to share his story in exchange for commentary from me and fellow blog readers. I've added comments inline. I'm now responsible for cleaning up a mid sized company perimeter defences... To be honest, at first glance the task is a daunting one, thousands of users, dozens of dis-separate systems and gigabits of network traffic plus as part of the enterprise support team, I have other projects and duties to deliver on. I managed to get time with the systems architect and run through a number of questions stolen from your books and other smart folks on the history and state of affairs of my new domain. My questions were answered or put in to context except for one. "Why don't you have any monitoring tools in place on the edge and perimeter systems?" The answer I received wasn't what I expected. He simple stated that no-one had the time or energy to take on this massive task. He was very pro about having mon

I've written several times about engineering disasters here and elsewhere. Watching more man-made failures on The History Channel's "Engineering Disasters," I realized lessons learned the hard way by safety, mechanical, and structural engineers and operators can be applied to those practicing digital security. >In 1983, en route from Virginia to Massachusetts, the World War II-era bulk carrier SS Marine Electric sank in high seas. The almost forty year-old ship was ferrying 24,000 tons of coal and 34 Merchant Mariners, none of whom had survival suits to resist the February chill of the Atlantic. All but three died. The owner of the ship, Marine Transport Lines (MTL), blamed the crew and one of the survivors, Chief Mate Bob Cusick, for the disaster. Investigations of the wreck and a trial revealed the Marine Electric's coal hatch covers were in disrepair, as reported by Cusick prior to the disaster. Apparently the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), an ins

Yes, I am on a roll. I admit to not reading every page of the book I just reviewed, however. I am not going to spend time learning about bare-metal HP-UX or AIX recoveries if I have no expertise in either subject (to check for mistakes) or desire to learn (because I do not admin either OS). Shortly Amazon.com will publish my four star review of Backup and Recovery by W. Curtis Preston . From the review : W. Curtis Preston is the king of backups, and his book Backup and Recovery (BAR) is easily the best book available on the subject. Preston makes many good decisions in this book, covering open source projects and considerations for commercial solutions. Tool discussions are accompanied by sound advice and plenty of short war stories. If the author addresses the few concerns I have in his next edition, that should be a five star book. I also received another book in the mail today, Secure Programming with Static Analysis by Brian Chess and Jacob West. I reviewed drafts of this

I teach various layer 2 attacks in my TCP/IP Weapons School class. Sometimes I wonder if students are thinking "That is so old! Who does that anymore?" In response I mention last year's Freenode incident where Ettercap was used in an ARP spoofing attack. Thanks to Robert Hensing 's pointer to Neil Carpenter's post , I have another documented ARP spoofing attack. Here a malicious IFRAME is injected into traffic by ARP spoofing a gateway. We cover that in my Black Hat class, both of which are now officially full. Please remember that TCP/IP Weapons School is a traffic analysis class. I believe I cover the most complicated network traces presented in any similar forum. All you need to get the most out of the class is a laptop running a recent version of Wireshark . The class is not about demonstrating tools or having students run tools. Other classes do a better job with that sort of requirement. The purpose of this class is to become a better network se

Amazon.com just published my five star review of Windows Forensic Analysis by Harlan Carvey . From the review : I loved Windows Forensic Analysis (WFA). It's the first five star book from Syngress I've read since early 2006. WFA delivered just what I hoped to read in a book of its size and intended audience, and my expectations were high. If your job requires investigating compromised Windows hosts, you must read WFA. In the mail today I received a copy of Fuzzing by ninjas Michael Sutton, Adam Greene, and Pedram Amini. H.D. Moore even wrote the foreword, for Pete's sake. However, I have some concerns about this book. I performed a technical review, mainly from the perspective of someone who wants to know more about how to do fuzzing. The drafts I read seemed to be more about how to build a fuzzer. Those of you who are jumping to hit the comment button -- I don't want to hear about "you learn how to fuzz by building a tool." Give me a chance to learn

Amazon.com just published my four-star review of Exploiting Software . From the review : I read Exploiting Software (ES) last year but realized I hadn't reviewed it yet. Having read other books by these authors, like McGraw's Software Security and Hoglund's Rootkits, I realized ES was not as good as those newer books. At the time ES was published (2004) it continued to define the software exploitation genre begun in Building Secure Software. However, I don't think it's necessary to pay close attention to ES when newer books by McGraw and Hoglund are now available. I'm looking forward to reading Network Warrior by Gary A. Donahue. This book has the second-best subtitle of all of the technical books on my shelves: Everything you need to know that wasn't on the CCNA exam I quickly skimmed this book at USENIX and I think it will be valuable. I like books that take nontraditional look at networking issues. If you're wondering what my favorite subtitle is

I am happy to report that work on OpenPacket.org is back on track, thanks to a new volunteer Web application developer. Please read the rest of the story at the Openpacket.org Blog .

As an Air Force officer I was taught the importance of situational awareness (SA). The surprisingly good (at least for now) Wikipedia entry describes SA as "knowing what is going on so you can figure out what to do" (Adam, 1993) and knowing "what you need to know not to be surprised" (Jeannot et al., 2003). Wikipedia also mentions fighter pilots who leveraged SA to win dogfights. When applied to information security, I like to use the term digital situational awareness (DSA). In 2005 invented the term pervasive network awareness (PNA) for my book Extrusion Detection to describe one way to achieve a certain degree of SA: Pervasive network awareness is the ability to collect the network-based information -- from the viewpoint of any node on the network -- required to make decisions. PNA is inherently an asset-centric means to improve SA. PNA involves watching assets for indications of violations of confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability (the CIA triad)