Thursday, July 28, 2011

Review of Metasploit: The Penetration Tester's Guide Posted just posted my four star review of Metasploit: The Penetration Tester's Guide by David Kennedy, Jim O’Gorman, Devon Kearns, and Mati Aharoni. From the review:

Metasploit: The Penetration Tester's Guide (MTPTG), is a great book about the Metasploit Framework. I first tried MSF in April 2004 (noted in one of my blog posts) and have since used it to test detection mechanisms, as well as simulate activity by certain threat groups. I've read MSF coverage in a few other books, but MTPTG really outdoes the competition. While I see areas for improvement to be addressed in a second edition, if you have any interest in Metasploit you should check out this book.

Review of Hacking: The Art of Exploitation, 2nd Ed Posted just posted my five star review of Hacking: The Art of Exploitation, 2nd Ed by Jon Erickson. From the review:

This is the last in a recent collection of reviews on "hacking" books. Jon Erickson's Hacking, 2nd Ed (H2E) is one of the most remarkable books in the group I just read. H2E is in some senses amazing because the author takes the reader on a journey through programming, exploitation, shellcode, and so forth, yet helps the reader climb each mountain. While the material is sufficiently technical to scare some readers away, those that remain will definitely learn more about the craft.

Review of Gray Hat Hacking, 3rd Ed Posted just posted my three star review of Gray Hat Hacking, 3rd Ed by Allen Harper, Shon Harris, Jonathan Ness, Chris Eagle, Gideon Lenkey, and Terron Williams. From the review:

Critical reviews are my least favorite aspect of my Amazon experience, but I believe readers expect me to be honest with them. Gray Hat Hacking, 3rd Ed (GHH3E) has a lot of potential, but it needs a reboot and a ruthless editor. I read and reviewed the original edition 6 1/2 years ago but skipped the 2nd Ed. This 3rd Ed (published in Jan 2011) features several exceptionally talented authors (such as Allen Harper and Chris Eagle), so my expectations remained high. Unfortunately, after finishing the book I had collected a pile of notes that I will try to transform into constructive commentary for a 4th Ed, which I would enjoy seeing!

Review of Ninja Hacking Posted just posted my four star review of Ninja Hacking by Thomas Wilhelm and Jason Andress. From the review:

Ninja Hacking is not a typical digital security book. When I saw the title I expected the use of "Ninja" to be a reference to a style of digital attack. While this is true to a certain extent, Ninja Hacking is about actual Ninja concepts applied to the digital world. The book is an introduction to Ninja history and techniques, applied to the modern digital security context. That was not at all what I expected, but I found the result intriguing.

Review of Managed Code Rootkits Posted just posted my five star review of Managed Code Rootkits by Erez Matula. From the review:

Managed Code Rootkits (MCR) is one of the best books I've read in 2011. MCR is a one-man tour-de-force through the world of malicious software that leverages managed code for its runtime. Prior to reading the book I was only vaguely aware of the concept and implementation. After reading MCR, I am wondering when we might see more of this technique in the wild. Author Erez Metula does almost everything right in MCR, and I strongly recommend reading it.

Review of Buffer Overflow Attacks Posted just posted my two star review of Buffer Overflow Attacks, by James C. Foster, et al. From the review:

I read "Buffer Overflow Attacks" as part of a collection of books on writing exploit code (reviewed separately). I have to give credit to the author team for writing one of the first books on this subject; Syngress published BOA in 2005, when the subject received less published coverage. However, better books are available now if you want to learn the sort of material found in BOA.

Risk Modeling, not "Threat Modeling"

Thanks to the great new book Metasploit (review pending), I learned of the Penetration Testing Execution Standard. According to the site, "It is a new standard designed to provide both businesses and security service providers with a common language and scope for performing penetration testing (i.e. security evaluations)." I think this project has a lot of promise given the people involved.

I wanted to provide one comment through my blog, since this topic is one I've covered previously. One of the goals of the standard is to name and explain the steps performed in a penetration test. One of them is currently called "threat modeling," and is partly explained using this diagram:

When I saw elements called "business assets," "threat agents," "business process," and so on, I realized this is more of a risk model, not just a "threat model."

I just tagged a few older posts as discussing threat model vs risk model linguistics, so they might help explain my thinking. This issue isn't life or death, but I think it would be more accurate to call this part of the PTES "Risk Modeling."

Wednesday, July 27, 2011

Noah Shachtman’s Pirates of the ISPs

Two posts in one day? I'm on fire! It's easy to blog when something interesting happens, and I can talk about it.

I wanted to mention the publication of Pirates of the ISPs: Tactics for Turning Online Crooks Into International Pariahs by Noah Shachtman, acting in his capacity as a Nonresident Fellow for Foreign Policy in the 21st Century Defense Initiative at The Brookings Institution. I read and commented on an earlier draft, and I think you will find Noah's paper interesting. From the introduction:

Cybercrime today seems like a nearly insoluble problem, much like piracy was centuries ago. There are steps, however, that can be taken to curb cybercrime’s growth—and perhaps begin to marginalize the people behind it.

Some of the methods used to sideline piracy provide a useful, if incomplete, template for how to get it done. Shutting down the markets for stolen treasure cut off the pirates’ financial lifeblood; similar pushes could be made against the companies that support online criminals.

Piracy was eventually brought to heel when nations took responsibility for what went on within its borders. Based on this precedent, cybercrime will only begin to be curbed when greater authority—and accountability—is exercised over the networks that form the sea on which these modern pirates sail.

I agree with this. My original comments to Noah emphasized that not all malicious activity on the Internet is crime, nor is it conducted by criminals. For example, I wince whenever I see the term APT in the same sentence as crime or criminals (never mind seeing the "cyber" prefix). As long as you keep Noah's emphasis on true crime in mind while you read the paper, I think you will find it compelling. Great work Noah!

SQL Injection Challenge and Time-Based Security

Thanks to this Tweet by @ryancbarnett, I learned of the lessons learned of the Level II component of the ModSecurity SQL Injection Challenge.

As stated on the challenge site, the goal is "To successful execute SQLi against the scanning vendor demo websites and to try and evade the OWASP ModSecurity CRS." The contestants need to identify a SQL injection vector within one of four demo websites, then enumerate certain information from the target.

As also stated on the challenge page, "Winners of this level will be anyone who is able to enumerate the data listed above for each demo app without triggering an Inbound ModSecurity Alert. If ModSecurity sees any inbound attacks or outbound application defects/info leakages, it will prepend a warning banner to the top of the page."

This is interesting, but what caught my attention is the time-based security metrics describing the results of Level II of the challenge. I'll reproduce the relevant section here:

Hacking Resistance (Time-to-Hack)

Many people wrongly assume that installing a Web Application Firewall will make their sites "Hack Proof." Sadly, this is not reality. The real goal of using a web application firewall should be to gain visibility and to make your web applications more difficult to hack meaning that it should take attackers significantly more time to hack a vulnerable web site with a WAF in front in blocking mode vs. if the WAF was not present at all.

The idea is to substantially increase the "Time-to-Hack" metric associated with compromising a site in order allow for operational security to identify the threat and take appropriate actions...

With this in mind, we analyzed how long it took for each Level II winner to develop a working evasion for the CRS v2.2.0. We are basing this off of the correlated IP address in the logs that was tied to the final evasion payloads submitted to the ModSecurity team. We also saw that many Level II winners actually tested their payloads using the CRS Demo page so we had to correlate test payloads there as well.

Avg. # of Requests to find an evasion: 433
Avg. Duration (Time to find an evasion): 72 hrs
Shortest # of Requests to find an evasion: 118
Shortest Duration (Time to find an evasion): 10 hrs

This data shows that having active monitoring and response capabilities of ongoing web attacks is paramount as it may only a matter of hours before a determined attacker finds a way through your defenses.

I [Ed: Ryan, not Richard] realize that there are a multitude of variables and conditions involved where people can say that these numbers are off (either too high or too low) depending on your defenses and attacker skill level. Keep in mind that this metric was obtained from the ModSecurity WAF using mainly a negative security model ruleset. The point of presenting this data, however, is to have some form of metric available for active web application monitoring and defense discussions related to exploitation timelines.

What a great use of empirical data to make a point about security! Like Ryan says, you can argue about the rating of the intruder (does 10 hours really reflect a skilled intruder?) or the defenses (is ModSecurity really sufficient?). I'd answer that they those aspects of the challenge are sound enough to use as benchmarks for a certain portion of the threat community and state-of-the-practice for defenses.

Ten hours, then, represents the window of time between when an intruder would first start trying to compromise the Web app, and when he succeeded. That means the IR team has no more than 10 hours to detect the activity and take action to close the window of vulnerability. That's a tall order, but we have a metric now based on more than hand-waving that we can use to start a discussion of capabilities.

On a related note, this is the sort of activity that a red team could undertake to simulate threat action and identify IR team effectiveness.

Tuesday, July 05, 2011

Bejtlich Teaching in Abu Dhabi in December

I'm pleased to announce that on December 12-13 at Black Hat Abu Dhabi I will teach a special two-day edition of TCP/IP Weapons School 3.0.

This class is designed for junior and intermediate security analysts. The "sweet spot" for the potential student is someone working in a security operations center (SOC) or computer incident response team (CIRT), or someone trying to establish one of those organizations. The class is very hands-on, and focuses on labs and discussions. There are less than 10 slides at the very beginning of the class, and I build the flow of the class based on what you want to hear.

If you would like details on the class, please see the linked site. You may also find my announcement for my Black Hat sessions on 30-31 July and 1-2 August to be helpful too. I'm looking forward to seeing you learn the investigative mindset needed to detect and respond to digital intrusions!

Black Hat has four remaining price points and deadlines for registration.

  • "Best" ends 15 August

  • "Early" ends 17 August

  • "Late" ends 12 December

  • Onsite starts at the conference

Seats are filling -- it pays to register early!

On a related note, we're almost one month away from my 8-9 August TCP/IP Weapons School 3.0 in San Francisco at USENIX Security 2011. Seats are filling in that class too!

I'm also still working on the details for a northern VA TCP/IP Weapons School 3.0 class. When I have them ready I will post them. Thank you.