Monday, May 04, 2020

New Book! The Best of TaoSecurity Blog, Volume 1



I'm very pleased to announce that I've published a new book!

It's The Best of TaoSecurity Blog, Volume 1: Milestones, Philosophy and Strategy, Risk, and Advice. It's available now in the Kindle Store, and if you're a member of Kindle Unlimited, it's currently free. I may also publish a print version. If you're interested, please tell me on Twitter.



The book lists at 332 pages and is over 83,000 words. I've been working on it since last year, but I've used the time in isolation to carry the first volume over the finish line.

The Amazon.com description says:

Since 2003, cybersecurity author Richard Bejtlich has been writing posts on TaoSecurity Blog, a site with 15 million views since 2011. Now, after re-reading over 3,000 posts and approximately one million words, he has selected and republished the very best entries from 17 years of writing.

In the first volume of the TaoSecurity Blog series, Bejtlich addresses milestones, philosophy and strategy, risk, and advice. Bejtlich shares his thoughts on leadership, the intruder's dilemma, managing burnout, controls versus assessments, insider versus outsider threats, security return on investment, threats versus vulnerabilities, controls and compliance, the post that got him hired at a Fortune 5 company as their first director of incident response, and much more.

He has written new commentaries to accompany each post, some of which would qualify as blog entries in their own right.  Read how the security industry, defensive methodologies, and strategies to improve career opportunities have evolved in this new book, written by one of the authors who has seen it all and survived to blog about it.

Finally, if you're interested in subsequent volumes, I have two planned.


I may also have a few other book projects in the pipeline. I'll have more to say on that in the coming weeks.

If you have any questions about the book, let me know. Currently you can see the table of contents via the "Look Inside" function, and there is a sample that lets you download and read some of the book. Enjoy!

Tuesday, April 07, 2020

If You Can't Patch Your Email Server, You Should Not Be Running It

CVE-2020-0688 Scan Results, per Rapid7

tl;dr -- it's the title of the post: "If You Can't Patch Your Email Server, You Should Not Be Running It."

I read a disturbing story today with the following news:

"Starting March 24, Rapid7 used its Project Sonar internet-wide survey tool to discover all publicly-facing Exchange servers on the Internet and the numbers are grim.

As they found, 'at least 357,629 (82.5%) of the 433,464 Exchange servers' are still vulnerable to attacks that would exploit the CVE-2020-0688 vulnerability.

To make matters even worse, some of the servers that were tagged by Rapid7 as being safe against attacks might still be vulnerable given that 'the related Microsoft update wasn’t always updating the build number.'

Furthermore, 'there are over 31,000 Exchange 2010 servers that have not been updated since 2012,' as the Rapid7 researchers observed. 'There are nearly 800 Exchange 2010 servers that have never been updated.'

They also found 10,731 Exchange 2007 servers and more than 166,321 Exchange 2010 ones, with the former already running End of Support (EoS) software that hasn't received any security updates since 2017 and the latter reaching EoS in October 2020."

In case you were wondering, threat actors have already been exploiting these flaws for weeks, if not months.

Email is one of, if not the most, sensitive and important systems upon which organizations of all shapes and sizes rely. The are, by virtue of their function, inherently exposed to the Internet, meaning they are within the range of every targeted or opportunistic intruder, worldwide.

In this particular case, unpatched servers are also vulnerable to any actor who can download and update Metasploit, which is virtually 100% of them.

It is the height of negligence to run such an important system in an unpatched state, when there are much better alternatives -- namely, outsourcing your email to a competent provider, like Google, Microsoft, or several others.

I expect some readers are saying "I would never put my email in the hands of those big companies!" That's fine, and I know several highly competent individuals who run their own email infrastructure. The problem is that they represent the small fraction of individuals and organizations who can do so. Even being extremely generous with the numbers, it appears that less than 20%, and probably less than 15% according to other estimates, can even keep their Exchange servers patched, let alone properly configured.

If you think it's still worth the risk, and your organization isn't able to patch, because you want to avoid megacorp email providers or government access to your email, you've made a critical miscalculation. You've essentially decided that it's more important for you to keep your email out of megacorp or government hands than it is to keep it from targeted or opportunistic intruders across the Internet.

Incidentally, you've made another mistake. Those same governments you fear, at least many of them, will just leverage Metasploit to break into your janky email server anyway.

The bottom line is that unless your organization is willing to commit the resources, attention, and expertise to maintaining a properly configured and patched email system, you should outsource it. Otherwise you are being negligent with not only your organization's information, but the information of anyone with whom you exchange emails.

Thursday, April 02, 2020

Seeing Book Shelves on Virtual Calls


I have a confession... for me, the best part of virtual calls, or seeing any reporter or commentator working for home, is being able to check out their book shelves. I never use computer video, because I want to preserve the world's bandwidth. That means I don't share what my book shelves look like when I'm on a company call. Therefore, I thought I'd share my book shelves with the world.

My big categories of books are martial arts, mixed/miscellaneous, cybersecurity and intelligence, and military and Civil War history. I've cataloged about 400 print books and almost 500 digital titles. Over the years I've leaned towards buying Kindle editions of any book that is mostly print, in order to reduce my footprint.

For the last many years, my book shelving has consisted of three units, each with five shelves. Looking at the topic distribution, as of 2020 I have roughly 6 shelves for martial arts, 4 for mixed/miscellaneous, 3 for cybersecurity and intelligence, and 2 for military and Civil War history.

This is interesting to me because I can compare my mix from five years ago, when I did an interview for the now defunct Warcouncil Warbooks project.


In that image from 2015, I can see 2 shelves for martial arts, 4 for mixed/miscellaneous, 7 for cybersecurity and intelligence, and 2 for military and Civil War history.

What happened to all of the cybersecurity and intelligence books? I donated a bunch of them, and the rest I'm selling on Amazon, along with books (in new or like new condition) that my kids decided they didn't want anymore.

I've probably donated hundreds, possibly approaching a thousand, cyber security and IT books over the years. These were mostly books sent by publishers, although some were those that I bought and no longer needed. Some readers from northern Virginia might remember me showing up at ISSA or NoVASec meetings with a boxes of books that I would leave on tables. I would say "I don't want to come home with any of these. Please be responsible. And guess what -- everyone was!

If anyone would like to share their book shelves, the best place would be as a reply to my Tweet on this post. I look forward to seeing your book shelves, fellow bibliophiles.

Friday, March 27, 2020

Skill Levels in Digital Security


Two posts in one day? These are certainly unusual times.

I was thinking about words to describe different skill levels in digital security. Rather than invent something, I decided to review terms that have established meaning. Thanks to Google Books I found this article in a 1922 edition of the Archives of Psychology that mentioned four key terms:

  1. The novice is a (person) who has no trade ability whatever, or at least none that could not be paralleled by practically any intelligent (person).
  2. An apprentice has acquired some of the elements of the trade but is not sufficiently skilled to be trusted with any important task.
  3. The journey(person) is qualified to perform almost any work done by members of the trade.
  4. An expert can perform quickly and with superior skill any work done by (people) in the trade.
I believe these four categories can apply to some degree to the needs of the digital security profession.

At GE-CIRT we had three levels -- event analyst, incident analyst, and incident handler. We did not hire novices, so those three roles map in some ways to apprentice, journeyperson, and expert. 

One difference with the classical description applies to how we worked with apprentices. We trusted apprentices, or event analysts, with specific tasks. We thought of this work as important, just as every role on a team is important. It may not have been leading an incident response, but without the work of the event and incident analysts, we may not have discovered many incidents!

Crucially, we encouraged event analysts, and incident analysts for that matter, to always be looking to exceed the parameters of their assigned duties.

However, we stipulated that if a person was working beyond their assigned duties, they had to have their work product reviewed by the next level of analysis. This enabled mentoring among the various groups. It also helped identify people who were candidates for promotion. If a person consistently worked beyond their assigned duties, and eventually reached a near-perfect or perfect ability to do that work, that proved he or she was ready to assume the next level.

This ability to access work beyond assigned duties is one reason I have problems with limiting data by role. I think everyone who works in a CIRT should have access to all of the data, assuming there are no classification, privacy, or active investigation constraints.

One of my laws is the following:

Analysts are good because they have good data. An expert with bad data is helpless. An apprentice with good data has a chance to do good work.

I've said it more eloquently elsewhere but this is the main point. 

For more information on the apprenticeship model, this article might be useful.

When You Should Blog and When You Should Tweet


I saw my like-minded, friend-that-I've-never-met Andrew Thompson Tweet a poll, posted above.

I was about to reply with the following Tweet:

"If I'm struggling to figure out how to capture a thought in just 1 Tweet, that's a sign that a blog post might be appropriate. I only use a thread, and no more than 2, and hardly ever 3 (good Lord), when I know I've got nothing more to say. "1/10," "1/n," etc. are not for me."

Then I realized I had something more to say, namely, other reasons blog posts are better than Tweets. For the briefest moment I considered adding a second Tweet, making, horror of horrors, a THREAD, and then I realized I would be breaking my own guidance.

Here are three reasons to consider blogging over Tweeting.

1. If you find yourself trying to pack your thoughts into a 280 character limit, then you should write a blog post. You might have a good idea, and instead of expressing it properly, you're falling into the trap of letting the medium define the message, aka the PowerPoint trap. I learned this from Edward Tufte: let the message define the medium, not the other way around.

2. Twitter threads lose the elegance and readability of the English language as our ancestors created it, for our benefit. They gave us structures, like sentences, lists, indentation, paragraphs, chapters, and so on. What does Twitter provide? 280 character chunks. Sure, you can apply feeble "1/n" annotations, but you've lost all that structure and readability, and for what?

3. In the event you're writing a Tweet thread that's really worth reading, writing it via Twitter virtually guarantees that it's lost to history. Twitter is an abomination for citation, search, and future reference. In the hierarchy of delivering content for current researchers and future generations, the hierarchy is the following, from lowest to highest:

  • "Transient," "bite-sized" social media, e.g., Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, etc. posts
  • Blog posts
  • Whitepapers
  • Academic papers in "electronic" journals
  • Electronic (e.g., Kindle) only formatted books
  • Print books (that may be stand-alone works, or which may contain journal articles)

Print book are the apex communication medium because we have such references going back hundreds of years. Hundreds of years from now, I doubt the first five formats above will be easily accessible, or accessible at all. However, in a library or personal collection somewhere, printed books will endure.

The bottom line is that if you think what you're writing is important enough to start a "1/n" Tweet thread, you've already demonstrated that Twitter is the wrong medium.

The natural follow-on might be: what is Twitter good for? Here are my suggestions:

  • Announcing a link to another, in-depth news resource, like a news article, blog post, whitepaper, etc.
  • Offering a comment on an in-depth news resource, or replying to another person's announcement.
  • Asking a poll question.
  • Asking for help on a topic.
  • Engaging in a short exchange with another user. Long exchanges on hot topics typically devolve into a confusing mess of messages and replies, that delivery of which Twitter has never really managed to figure out.

I understand the seduction of Twitter. I use it every day. However, when it really matters, blogging is preferable, followed by the other media I listed in point 3 above.

Update 0930 ET 27 Mar 2020: I forgot to mention that in extenuating circumstances, like live-Tweeting an emergency, Twitter threads on significant matters are fine because the urgency of the situation and the convenience or plain logistical limitations of the situation make Twitter indispensable. I'm less thrilled by live-Tweeting in conferences, although I'm guilty of it in the past. I'd prefer a thoughtful wrap-up post following the event, which I did a lot before Twitter became popular.

Thursday, March 12, 2020

COVID-19 Phishing Tests: WRONG

Malware Jake Tweeted a poll last night which asked the following:

"I have an interesting ethical quandary. Is it ethically okay to use COVID-19 themed phishing emails for assessments and user awareness training right now? Please read the thread before responding and RT for visibility. 1/"

Ultimately he decided:

"My gut feeling is to not use COVID-19 themed emails in assessments/training, but to TELL users to expect them, though I understand even that might discourage consumption of legitimate information, endangering public health. 6/"

I responded by saying this was the right answer.

Thankfully there were many people who agreed, despite the fact that voting itself was skewed towards the "yes" answer.

There were an uncomfortable number of responses to the Tweet that said there's nothing wrong with red teams phishing users with COVID-19 emails. For example:

"Do criminals abide by ethics? Nope. Neither should testing."

"Yes. If it's in scope for the badguys [sic], it's in scope for you."

"Attackers will use it. So I think it is fair game."

Those are the wrong answers. As a few others outlined well in their responses, the fact that a criminal or intruder employs a tactic does not mean that it's appropriate for an offensive security team to use it too.

I could imagine several COVID-19 phishing lures that could target school districts and probably cause high double-digit click-through rates. What's the point of that? For a "community" that supposedly considers fear, uncertainty, and doubt (FUD) to be anathema, why introduce FUD via a phishing test?

I've grown increasingly concerned over the past few years that there's a "cult of the offensive" that justifies its activities with the rationale that "intruders do it, so we should too." This is directly observable in the replies to Jake's Tweet. It's a thin veneer that covers bad behavior, outweighing the small benefit accrued to high-end, 1% security shops against the massive costs suffered by the vast majority of networked global organizations.

The is a selfish, insular mindset that is reinforced by the echo chamber of the so-called "infosec community." This "tribe" is detached from the concerns and ethics of the larger society. It tells itself that what it is doing is right, oblivious or unconcerned with the costs imposed on the organizations they are supposedly "protecting" with their backwards actions.

We need people with feet in both worlds to tell this group that their approach is not welcome in the broader human community, because the costs it imposes vastly outweigh the benefits.

I've written here about ethics before, usually in connection with the only real value I saw in the CISSP -- its code of ethics. Reviewing the "code," as it appears now, shows the following:

"There are only four mandatory canons in the Code. By necessity, such high-level guidance is not intended to be a substitute for the ethical judgment of the professional.

Code of Ethics Preamble:

The safety and welfare of society and the common good, duty to our principals, and to each other, requires that we adhere, and be seen to adhere, to the highest ethical standards of behavior.
Therefore, strict adherence to this Code is a condition of certification.

Code of Ethics Canons:

Protect society, the common good, necessary public trust and confidence, and the infrastructure.
Act honorably, honestly, justly, responsibly, and legally.
Provide diligent and competent service to principals.
Advance and protect the profession."

This is almost worthless. The only actionable item in the "code" is the word "legally," implying that if a CISSP holder was convicted of a crime, he or she could lose their certification. Everything else is subject to interpretation.

Contrast that with the USAFA Code of Conduct:

"We will not lie, steal, or cheat, nor tolerate among us anyone who does."

While it still requires an Honor Board to determine if a cadet has lied, stolen, cheated, or tolerated, there's much less gray in this statement of the Academy's ethics. Is it perfect? No. Is it more actionable than the CISSP's version? Absolutely.

I don't have "solutions" to the ethical bankruptcy manifesting in some people practicing what they consider to be "information security." However, this post is a step towards creating red lines that those who are not already hardened in their ways can observe and integrate.

Perhaps at some point we will have an actionable code of ethics that helps newcomers to the field understand how to properly act for the benefit of the human community.