Snort Report 16 Posted
My 16th Snort Report titled When Snort Is Not Enough has been posted. From the article:
[I]t's important to understand how a network intrusion detection system (IDS) like Snort and techniques based upon its use fit into a holistic detection and response operation. Placing Snort within an entire security program is too broad a topic to cover in this Snort Report. Rather, let's consider when a tool like Snort is independently helpful and when you should support Snort with complementary tools and techniques.
[I]t's important to understand how a network intrusion detection system (IDS) like Snort and techniques based upon its use fit into a holistic detection and response operation. Placing Snort within an entire security program is too broad a topic to cover in this Snort Report. Rather, let's consider when a tool like Snort is independently helpful and when you should support Snort with complementary tools and techniques.
Comments
Daemonlogger is cool, but what do you think about more sophisticated approaches like the Time Machine ? ( http://www.net.t-labs.tu-berlin.de/research/tm/ )
Is there some value in retaining full content of long running (possibly encrypted) sessions ?
This is why I originally started developing the Realeyes IDS (http://realeyes.sourceforge.net). Having worked on a network monitoring team for several years, I know that the more context available for the analyst, the more effective and efficient the results will be. Snort helped us somewhat, but did not alert us to any of our severity 1 compromises. Those were reported by a tool that provided the extra data that you are recommending.
Later . . . Jim