Brief Thoughts on Cisco AON

I received my copy of Cisco's Packet Magazine, Fourth Quarter 2005 recently. The new digital format for the magazine makes linking to anything impossible, but I found the relevant article as a .pdf.

It describes the company's Application-Oriented Networking (AON) initiative. According to this story that quotes Cisco personnel, AON "is a network-embedded intelligent message routing system that integrates application message-level communication, visibility, and security into the fabric of the network." According to this document:

Cisco AON is currently available in two products that integrate into Cisco switches and routers:

  • Cisco Catalyst® 6500 Series AON module, which is primarily deployed in enterprise core or data centers

  • Cisco 2600/2800/3700/3800 series AON module, which is primarily deployed at branch offices

AON is part of Cisco's Intelligent Information Network project. From the article:

"The Cisco AON module in the branch puts intelligent decision-making at the network edge. It can intercept and analyze traffic in various message formats and protocols and bridge between them, provide security, and validate messages, creating a transparent interface between trading partners and, in effect, a good business-to-business gateway. It can manage remote devices that send messages to the Cisco Integrated Services Router in the branch. It can also filter messages from multiple sources that come into the branch router for duplicates or by other criteria, aggregate them, make decisions according to instructions, and transmit selected messages to a sister AON module deployed in the data center." (emphasis added)

I find this aspect very interesting. It sounds like AON could be used to enforce protocol and security policies. I wonder if this might eventually happen on a per-port basis? Security on a per-port basis would allow validation of network traffic itself, not just whether a host should be accessing the network. Per-port security would move the job of enforcing security away from choke-point products like firewalls (which include IPSs, application firewalls, whatever) and into switches.

This is not necessarily a great idea, as this Register article confirms. One of the strengths of the Internet has been the fact that it inverted the telecom model, where the network was smart and the end device (the phone) was dumb. The traditional Internet featured a relatively dumb network whose main job was to get traffic from point A to point B. The intelligence was found in those end points. This Internet model simplified troubleshooting and allowed a plethora of protocols to be carried from point A to point B.

With so-called "intelligent networking," points A and B have to be sure that the network will transmit their conversation, and not block, modify, or otherwise interfere with that exchange to the detriment of the end hosts. As a security person I am obviously in favor of efforts to enforce security policies, but I am not in favor of adding another layer of complexity on top of existing infrastructures if it can be avoided.


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