Minneapolis Bridge Lessons for Digital Security
The Minneapolis bridge collapse is a tragedy. I had two thoughts that related to security.
Do you agree with that assessment? If yes, why do you think response 1 (try to improve the "bridge" and similar operations) is the response to every digital security attack (i.e., case 2)? My short answer: everyone blames the victim, not the criminal.
The NTSB is on scene in Minneapolis with law enforcement to figure out if the bridge collapse was caused by scenario 1 or 2. Why don't we have a National Digital Security Board investigating breaches? My short answer: it's easier to hide a massive security breach than the destruction of any bridge, building, plane, or train.
- If the bridge collapsed due to structural or design flaws, the proper response is to investigate the designers, contractors, inspectors, and maintenance personnel from a safety and negligence perspective. Based on the findings architectural and construction changes plus new safety operations might be applied in the future. This is a technical and operational response.
- If the bridge collapsed due to attack, the proper response is to investigate, apprehend, proseceute, and incarcerate the criminals. Redesigning bridges to withstand bomb attack is unlikely. This is a threat reduction and deterrence response.
Do you agree with that assessment? If yes, why do you think response 1 (try to improve the "bridge" and similar operations) is the response to every digital security attack (i.e., case 2)? My short answer: everyone blames the victim, not the criminal.
The NTSB is on scene in Minneapolis with law enforcement to figure out if the bridge collapse was caused by scenario 1 or 2. Why don't we have a National Digital Security Board investigating breaches? My short answer: it's easier to hide a massive security breach than the destruction of any bridge, building, plane, or train.
Comments
I think if #1, They understated the "minor things that needed attention". The bridge was reported to be about 40 years old and was last inspected in 2006.
Could this be a case of set it and forget it based on assumption that concrete construction couldn't fail in only 40 years because the designers claimed it would have to be replaced in 2020?
Sounds a lot like security companies and the misgivings of management when the security folks say "it's a minor risk if we leave it". Ooops.
It is an awful tragedy.
Its not a cement bridge. It was a steel bridge. In fact it had many construction qualities about it that made it unique including one of the longer steel beam spans so they could avoid putting the peers in the water. So, imho, its a bad example.
But to your point - I was at defcon over the weekend and it continues to amaze me how many people avoid using the network because "its hostile" (i fail to see how its more hostile than an airports wifi but I digress). Both myself and peers happily plugged in and even vpn'ed to our respective companies networks to grabbed e-mail. Why did we do this? Simple because our defenses are sound. You can build sound, stable, and secure infrastructure that can withstand attacks. The problem is many don't.
It's JB - making a comment on your bridge post just to try to figure out how to get in touch with you. Remember me, I'm the Alt-F4 guy...?
Hope you're doing well and would like a way to contact you directly. Email me at jabesnyder@hotmail.com and I'll reply.
Best,
JB
At this point, after the data theft has taken place, my guess is that no one knows the company is a victim because the party is too afraid or too ashamed to come forward. What do you think of laws that compel companies to report data theft or security breaches? Do they work well? Also do you think that these crimes are more widespread than reported, or has vendor hype in an attempt to sell security tools caused reporters to sensationalize the issue? Thanks.
The US has pretty much avoided suicide attackers so far(outside of 9/11), but deterrence is hard to do against them.
I'm not sure what the response is, because hardening a bridge seems nearly impossible. I think we need to just live with an attack every N years, like we deal with M thousand driving deaths every 1 year.
A board to discuss the collapse
What about the costs of upgrading the bridge? Maybe it was outdated and new discoveries and technologies could have dramatically improved it? Then we get into talks about costs and risks, which isn't really fair in comparison to digital security because of the human life factor. The same with Katrina and the levees not being good enough for that 500-year storm. Risk was taken and they failed on those odds...
I don't think there is any right answer unless you can answer the question: Do you work under the assumption that you need perfect security (craftmanship/safety) or do you work on some gradient of risk?
I read in one place that they were working on the bridge in recent weeks. It might be possible that work interrupted the integrity of the bridge, maybe maintenance or perhaps upgrades? Even Blackberry can tell us about the possibilities for upgrades taking something offline for a moment...
(Sorry I'm not more cohesive in my response, sitting in a coffeeshop at the moment...)
Most other security researchers do ... even ones that are better than you.
Are you talking to me? If yes, what part about "Dedicated to FreeBSD, network security monitoring, incident response, and network forensics. Email taosecurity at gmail dot com." at the top of my blog did you miss? And why the need to mention anyone "better than me?"
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/08/07/hausmannobit/
So, the tragedy had a more direct link to network and information security than even Richard’s post imagined.