There are FISMA scores for 2006, along with 2005, 2004, and 2003 -- some of which I discussed previously. What I wrote earlier still stands:
Notice that these grades do not reflect the effectiveness of any of these security measurements. An agency could be completely 0wn3d (compromised in manager-speak) and it could still receive high scores. I imagine it is difficult to grade effectiveness until a common set of security metrics is developed, including ways to count and assess incidents.
I still believe FISMA is a joke and a jobs program for so-called security companies without the technical skills to operationally defend systems.
The only benefit I've seen from FISMA is that low-scoring agencies are being embarrassed into doing more certification and accreditation. C&A is a waste of time and money. However, if security staff can redirect some of that time and money into technical security work that really makes a difference, then FISMA is indirectly helping agencies with poor scores. Agencies with high scores are no more secure than agencies with low scores. High-scoring agencies just write good reports, because FISMA is a giant paperwork exercise that makes no difference on the security playing field.
If you believe otherwise you're welcome to your opinion. You're also welcome to the lack of a future job when the FISMA consulting boondoggle ends and report jockeys are left without any marketable technical skills. If you want to know more about this, reading my old FISMA posts is sufficient. I don't need to restate my arguments when they're archived.
If I sound bitter, it's because I've seen my taxpaying dollars wasted for the past five years while various unauthorized parties have their way with these agencies. FISMA is not working.