TaoSecurity Blog

This week The Diplomat published an article by Dr Greg Austin titled  What the US Gets Wrong About Chinese Cyberespionage . The subtitle teases the thesis: "Is it government policy in China to pass on commercial secrets obtained via cyberespionage to civil sector firms?" As you might expect (because it prompted me to write this post), the author's answer is "no." The following contains the argument: "Chinese actors may be particularly adept in certain stages of economic espionage, but it is almost certainly not Chinese government policy to allow the transfer of trade secrets collected by highly classified intelligence sources to its civil sector firms for non-military technologies on a wide-spread basis . A U.S. influencing strategy toward China premised on the claim that this is China’s policy would appear to be ill-advised based on the evidence introduced so far by the United States in the public domain." (emphasis added) I find it interest

I recently read a manuscript discussing computer crime and security. I've typed out several excerpts and published them below. Please read them and try to determine how recently this document was written. The first excerpt discusses the relationship between the computer and the criminal. "The impersonality of the computer and the fact that it symbolizes for so many a system of uncaring power tend not only to incite efforts to strike back at the machine but also to provide certain people with a set of convenient rationalizations for engaging in fraud or embezzlement. The computer lends an ideological cloak for the carrying out of criminal acts. Computer crime... also holds several other attractions for the potential lawbreaker. It provides intellectual challenge -- a form of breaking and entering in which the burglar’s tools are essentially an understanding of the logical structure of and logical flaws inherent in particular programming and processing systems. It opens