Thursday, March 20, 2014

Are Nation States Responsible for Evil Traffic Leaving Their Networks?

During recent talks to various audiences, I've mentioned discussions within the United Nations. One point from these discussions involved certain nation states agreeing to modes of behavior in cyber space. I found the document containing these recent statements: A/68/98, Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (pdf). This document is hosted within the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, in the developments in the field of information and telecommunications section.

Fifteen countries were involved in producing this document: Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Canada, China, Egypt, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

Within the section titled "Recommendations on norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour by States," I found the following noteworthy:

19. International law, and in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable and is essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible ICT environment...

23. States must meet their international obligations regarding internationally wrongful acts attributable to them. States must not use proxies to commit internationally wrongful acts. States should seek to ensure that their territories are not used by non-State actors for unlawful use of ICTs.

The first statement is important because it "imports" a large body of external law and agreements into the cyber field, for good or ill.

The second statement is important because, if States obey these principles, it has interesting effects upon malicious activity leaving State networks. Collectively these sentences imply that States are responsible for their networks. States can't claim that they are only innocent intrusion victims, and that any malicious activity leaving their State isn't their fault or problem.

Whether States try to meet these obligations, and whether others call them out for not meeting them, is another matter.

Sunday, March 16, 2014

Five Thoughts from VADM Rogers Testimony

I had a chance to read Advance Questions for Vice Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN (pdf) this weekend.

I wanted to share five thoughts based on excerpts from the VADM Rogers' answers to written questions posed by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

1. The Committee asked: Can deterrence be an effective strategy in the absence of reliable attribution?

VADM Rogers responded: Yes, I believe there can be effective levels of deterrence despite the challenges of attribution. Attribution has improved, but is still not timely in many circumstances...

Cyber presence, being forward deployed in cyberspace, and garnering the indications and warnings of our most likely adversaries can help (as we do with our forces dedicated to Defend the Nation). (emphasis added)

I wonder if "cyber presence" and "being forward deployed in cyberspace" means having access to adversary systems? There's little doubt as to the source of an attack if you are resident on the system launching the attack.

2. The Committee asked: Is it advisable to develop cyberspace officers as we do other combat arms or line officers? Why or why not?

VADM Rogers responded: ...We must find a way to simultaneously ensure combat arms and line officers are better prepared to contribute, and cyberspace officers are able to enjoy a long, meaningful career with upward mobility. A meaningful career should allow them to fully develop as specialized experts, mentor those around them, and truly influence how we ought to train and fight in this mission space. 

I am especially interested in the merit of how a visible commitment to valuing cyberspace officers in our ranks will affect recruitment and retention. I believe that many of today’s youth who are uniquely prepared to contribute (e.g. formally educated or self-developed technical expertise) do not feel there is a place for them in our uniformed services

We must find a way to strengthen the message of opportunity and I believe part of the answer is to do our part to ensure cyberspace officers are viewed as equals in the eyes of line and combat arms officers; not enablers, but equals. Equals with capabilities no less valued than those delivered by professional aviators, special operators, infantry, or surface warfare. (emphasis added)

In my opinion, the best way to meet these goals is to create a separate Cyber Force. Please read the article Time for a US Cyber Force by Admiral James Stavridis (ret) and David Weinstein.

3. The Committee asked: The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes U.S. Cyber Command as a subunified command reporting to U.S. Strategic Command. We understand that the Administration considered modifying the UCP to establish U.S. Cyber Command as a full combatant command.
What are the best arguments for and against taking such action now?

VADM Rogers responded: ...The argument for full Unified Command status is probably best stated in terms of the threat. Cyber attacks may occur with little warning, and more than likely will allow only minutes to seconds to mount a defensive action seeking to prevent or deflect potentially significant harm to U.S critical infrastructure. 

Existing department processes and procedures for seeking authorities to act in response to such emergency actions are limited to Unified Combatant Commanders. If confirmed, as the Commander of U.S. CYBERCOM, as a Sub-unified Combatant Commander I would be required to coordinate and communicate through Commander, U.S. Strategic Command to seek Secretary of Defense or even Presidential approval to defend the nation in cyberspace. 

In a response cycle of seconds to minutes, this could come with a severe cost and could even obviate any meaningful action. As required in the current Standing Rules of Engagement, as a Combatant Commander, I would have the requisite authorities to directly engage with SECDEF or POTUS as necessary to defend the nation. (emphasis added)

I'm dismayed but not surprised by this argument. I'm dismayed because it sounds like the most important reason to establish a unified cyber command is the perception that "cyber attacks...allow only minutes to seconds to mount a defensive action." This is just not true for any strategically significant attack.

If you only have "minutes to seconds" left for defense, you are way too far down the kill chain. You need to be intercepting the adversary in the reconnaissance phase, or at least no earlier than the stage whereby the threat explores the target searching for critical elements. I fear the "minutes to seconds" camp is a legacy of the bad old days of Internet worms from 10 years ago.

4. The Committee asked: How could the Internet be redesigned to provide greater inherent security?

VADM Rogers responded: Advancements in technology continually change the architecture of the Internet. Cloud computing, for instance, is a significant change in how industry and individuals use Internet services... 

Several major providers of Internet services are already implementing increased security in email and purchasing services by using encryption for all transmissions from the client to the server. It is possible that the service providers could be given more responsibility to protect end clients connected directly to their infrastructures. 

They are in a position to stop attacks targeted at consumers and recognize when consumer devices on their networks have been subverted. The inability of end users to verify the originator of an email and for hackers to forge email addresses have resulted in serious compromises of end user systems... (emphasis added)

So, we see reference to cloud computing, encrypting client-to-server communications, ISPs protecting end users, and email verification. Think of all the tactical and technology options that were not mentioned here. Also notice the lack of discussion of better operations/campaigns and strategies. Finally, notice the Committee asked about redesigning the Internet, an engineering-focused approach.

5.  I am glad to live in a country where a candidate to lead important military and intelligence agencies can be questioned in then open for public benefit. However, I am disappointed that the Unified Command Plan (UCP), referenced several times in the Q&A, remains a classified document.

The best we seem to have is The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress, (pdf) a 2013 Congressional Research Service document hosted by FAS, and History of the Unified Command Plan (pdf), hosted by dtic.mil. The 2012 CRS report is posted on a state.gov Web site. It would be helpful to read an unclassified version of the next UCP, which is due anytime it seems.

PHOTO CREDIT: Gary Cameron, Reuters.

Saturday, March 08, 2014

Bejtlich Teaching at Black Hat USA 2014

I'm pleased to announce that I will be teaching one class at Black Hat USA 2014 2-3 and 4-5 August 2014 in Las Vegas, Nevada. The class is Network Security Monitoring 101. I've taught this class in Las Vegas in July 2013 and Seattle in December 2013. I posted Feedback from Network Security Monitoring 101 Classes last year as a sample of the student commentary I received.

This class is the perfect jumpstart for anyone who wants to begin a network security monitoring program at their organization. You may enter with no NSM knowledge, but when you leave you'll be able to understand, deploy, and use NSM to detect and respond to intruders, using open source software and repurposed hardware.

The first discounted registration deadline is 11:59 pm EDT June 2nd. The second discounted registration deadline (more expensive than the first but cheaper than later) ends 11:59 pm EDT July 26th. You can register here.

Please note: I have no plans to teach this class again in the United States. I haven't decided yet if I will not teach the class at Black Hat Europe 2014 in Amsterdam in October.

Since starting my current Black Hat teaching run in 2007, I've completely replaced each course every other year. In 2007-2008 I taught TCP/IP Weapons School version 1. In 2009-2010 I taught TCP/IP Weapons School version 2. In 2011-2012 I taught TCP/IP Weapons School version 3. In 2013-2014 I taught Network Security Monitoring 101. This fall I would need to design a brand new course to continue this trend.

I have no plans to design a new course for 2015 and beyond. If you want to see me teach Network Security Monitoring and related subjects, Black Hat USA is your best option.

Please sign up soon, for two reasons. First, if not enough people sign up early, Black Hat might cancel the class. Second, if many people sign up, you risk losing a seat. With so many classes taught in Las Vegas, the conference lacks the large rooms necessary to support big classes.

Several students asked for a more complete class outline. So, in addition to the outline posted currently by Black Hat, I present the following that shows what sort of material I cover in my new class.

OVERVIEW

Is your network safe from intruders? Do you know how to find out? Do you know what to do when you learn the truth? If you are a beginner, and need answers to these questions, Network Security Monitoring 101 (NSM101) is the newest Black Hat course for you. This vendor-neutral, open source software-friendly, reality-driven two-day event will teach students the investigative mindset not found in classes that focus solely on tools. NSM101 is hands-on, lab-centric, and grounded in the latest strategies and tactics that work against adversaries like organized criminals, opportunistic intruders, and advanced persistent threats. Best of all, this class is designed *for beginners*: all you need is a desire to learn and a laptop ready to run a virtual machine. Instructor Richard Bejtlich has taught over 1,000 Black Hat students since 2002, and this brand new, 101-level course will guide you into the world of Network Security Monitoring.

CLASS OUTLINE

Day One

0900-1030
·         Introduction
·         Enterprise Security Cycle
·         State of South Carolina case study
·         Difference between NSM and Continuous Monitoring
·         Blocking, filtering, and denying mechanisms
·         Why does NSM work?
·         When NSM won’t work
·         Is NSM legal?
·         How does one protect privacy during NSM operations?
·         NSM data types
·         Where can I buy NSM?

1030-1045
·         Break

1045-1230
·         SPAN ports and taps
·         Making visibility decisions
·         Traffic flow
·         Lab 1: Visibility in ten sample networks
·         Security Onion introduction
·         Stand-alone vs server plus sensors
·         Core Security Onion tools
·         Lab 2: Security Onion installation

1230-1400
·         Lunch

1400-1600
·         Guided review of Capinfos, Tcpdump, Tshark, and Argus
·         Lab 3: Using Capinfos, Tcpdump, Tshark, and Argus

1600-1615
·         Break

1615-1800
·         Guided review of Wireshark, Bro, and Snort
·         Lab 4: Using Wireshark, Bro, and Snort
·         Using Tcpreplay with NSM consoles
·         Guided review of process management, key directories, and disk usage
·         Lab 5: Process management, key directories, and disk usage

Day Two

0900-1030
·         Computer incident detection and response process
·         Intrusion Kill Chain
·         Incident categories
·         CIRT roles
·         Communication
·         Containment techniques
·         Waves and campaigns
·         Remediation
·         Server-side attack pattern
·         Client-side attack pattern

1030-1045
·         Break

1045-1230
·         Guided review of Sguil
·         Lab 6: Using Sguil
·         Guided review of ELSA
·         Lab 7: Using ELSA

1230-1400
·         Lunch

1400-1600
·         Lab 8. Intrusion Part 1 Forensic Analysis
·         Lab 9. Intrusion Part 1 Console Analysis

1600-1615
·         Break

1615-1800
·         Lab 10. Intrusion Part 2 Forensic Analysis
·         Lab 11. Intrusion Part 2 Console Analysis

REQUIREMENTS

Students must be comfortable using command line tools in a non-Windows environment such as Linux or FreeBSD. Basic familiarity with TCP/IP networking and packet analysis is a plus.

WHAT STUDENTS NEED TO BRING

NSM101 is a LAB-DRIVEN course. Students MUST bring a laptop with at least 8 GB RAM and at least 20 GB free on the hard drive. The laptop MUST be able to run a virtualization product that can CREATE VMs from an .iso, such as VMware Workstation (minimum version 8, 9 or 10 is preferred); VMware Player (minimum version 5 -- older versions do not support VM creation); VMware Fusion (minimum version 5, for Mac); or Oracle VM VirtualBox (minimum version 4.2). A laptop with access to an internal or external DVD drive is preferred, but not mandatory.

Students SHOULD test the open source Security Onion (http://securityonion.blogspot.com) NSM distro prior to class. The students should try booting the latest version of the 12.04 64 bit Security Onion distribution into live mode. Students MUST ensure their laptops can run a 64 bit virtual machine. For help with this requirement, see the VMware knowledgebase article “Ensuring Virtualization Technology is enabled on your VMware host (1003944)” (http://kb.vmware.com/selfservice/microsites/search.do?language=en_US&cmd=displayKC&externalId=1003944). Students MUST have the BIOS password for their laptop in the event that they need to enable virtualization support in class. Students MUST also have administrator-level access to their laptop to install software, in the event they need to reconfigure their laptop in class.

WHAT STUDENTS WILL RECEIVE

Students will receive a paper class handbook with printed slides, a lab workbook, and the teacher’s guide for the lab questions. Students will also receive a DVD with a recent version of the Security Onion NSM distribution.

TRAINERS

Richard Bejtlich is Chief Security Strategist at FireEye, and was Mandiant's Chief Security Officer when FireEye acquired Mandiant in 2013. He is a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, a board member at the Open Information Security Foundation, and an advisor to Threat Stack. He was previously Director of Incident Response for General Electric, where he built and led the 40-member GE Computer Incident Response Team (GE-CIRT). Richard began his digital security career as a military intelligence officer in 1997 at the Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team (AFCERT), Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC), and Air Intelligence Agency (AIA). Richard is a graduate of Harvard University and the United States Air Force Academy. His fourth book is "The Practice of Network Security Monitoring" (nostarch.com/nsm). He also writes for his blog (taosecurity.blogspot.com) and Twitter (@taosecurity), and teaches for Black Hat.